Gujarat Election 2017 Results & Look Ahead to 2019

It is often said that when the results of elections are declared only one side is happy: the winner & only one side is dejected: the loser.  This would one of the exceptions to that rule where both sides BJP & Congress have reasons to be both happy & sad. BJP did overcome quite a few obstacles in its path but cannot be happy that inspite of high voltage campaign led by PM Narendra Modi its seats went down to double figures that too in his home state. Congress while happy that this has been its best performance since 1985 has to be disappointed that inspite of strong headwinds against BJP including 22 years of anti-incumbency, social unrest among certain caste groups & economic woes in rural areas it couldn’t dislodge the BJP from power. This election should be best viewed as a “political draw”.

2017 GUJARAT RESULT

BJP captured 99 seats (a sharp decline from the 115 seats in 2012) slightly below my prediction of “low triple digits” in blog from couple of weeks ago. Congress increased its tally from 61 to 77 (+3 from allies). The 77 number is impressive considering the fact that earlier this year during the rebellion before Rajya Sabha elections it lost few MLA’s & its effective strength was only 44 in the outgoing assembly. In one of the most interesting paradoxes of this election BJP lost 16 seats but its vote share increased from 47.9 to 49.1% (+1.2%). 

This most likely caused excitement after the final round of voting among some BJP/RSS insiders who perceived this to be a sign of a BJP landslide. This even put in confusion now doubting my original prediction of just over 100. The results are good learning lesson for me to see that one can’t make predictions based on just one party’s vote share without knowing your opponents as well. Congress+ (i.e. Congress + ally Gujarat Tribal Party) increased its vote share from 38.9 to 42.1% (+3.2%).  The others i.e. 3^rd parties & Independents vote was almost cut in half from 13.2 to 7% (-6.2%). Other Parties like Keshubhai’ s now defunct GPP or Sharad Pawar’s NCP or Nitish Kumar JD(U) which earlier split anti-BJP votes collapsed allowing all anti BJP votes to coalesce around the Congress alliance. This massively helped Congress pip the BJP in a lot of extremely close contests especially in rural areas.

Region wise BJP was able to mostly hold the status quo against Congress in both North Gujarat (-1 vs 2012): ground zero for Hardik, Alpesh & Jignesh’s movements) & South Gujarat ( -3 vs 2012) : center of GST protests by traders & Patidar protests. Central Gujarat the BJP stronghold the performance was same as last time. However in Saurasthra, BJP suffered a huge loss of 12 seats which caused its overall number to fall below the physiological “feel good” mark of 100. Urban centers like Rajkot did well but the rural areas of Saurashtra were unkind to BJP where it saw massive anger due to rural distress translate into votes for Congress. Congress vote share increased by 8% in Saurashtra (interestingly equal to the GPP vote share by Keshubhai in 2012). This shift in votes from a 3^rd party to Congress caused several BJP seats to switch to Congress this time around (vs being split 2 ways against BJP in 2012).

BJP supporters tried to take heart from the 7% delta in vote share vs Cong. & the overall 49% vote share. But that is a bit skewed due to massive win margins (median: 44,000) in all the cities in Gujarat translating to winning 75% of all urban (& semi urban seats). However in rural areas there super close contests where both BJP’s & Congress wins are by slender margins (BJP median: 16K vs Congress 13K). Thus in rural areas Congress was able to win around 58% of seats (exactly same % as won in the local body elections in 2015 after Patidar agitation started). However this number was not large enough to offset the losses in urban areas & BJP sneaked home with a tiny 7 seat majority in the new assembly.

Some have reported that NCP & BSP got more votes that margin of victory for BJP over Congress in around dozen constituencies. As I predicted the 3^rd parties to be the X factor in the election which was one of the factors that led me to predict that  BJP had better chance of winning vs Cong vs vice versa. But it is not right to blame them as some have done for it to be the factor for Congress loss. When an election is this close you can blame every tiny thing that goes against you as the being “the factor” for your loss. (Remember all the reason being put out there for Hillary close loss in 2016 US presidential election). Similar arguments have been made for NOTA (None of the above) votes > margin of victory in 30 seats (BJP 15 Cong 13 Others 2). BJP supporters have claimed that if the NOTA votes transferred to them they would have same number as before but this a bit of stretch as there is no way to independently verify if all these voters were going vote for BJP indeed in absence of NOTA option.

Looking at the factors that influenced the election there doesn’t seem to a massive defection of Patels from BJP to Congress with both getting roughly same % of Patel votes (vs roughly ¾ to ¼ in 2012 in favor of BJP). Across the entire state in seats with substantial Patel population BJP won more seats than Congress. If it was a rebellion against BJP across the whole state there should have been big losses in seats in all regions but it was primarily restricted to Saurashtra.  Losses in Saurashtra for BJP have been primarily in rural areas. These areas which are heavily dependent on groundnut & cotton farming have considerable no. of Patels. Hardik Patel did manage to pick up disenchantment in rural areas to his advantage but please note that a greater correlation for Cong. doing better exists with rural seats vs Patel seats. This is the reason why many have said (a view I share) that the bigger issue was rural distress vs Patidar agitation. As Nistula Hebbar (The Hindu) in her column has said that what knocked down the BJP numbers was not PAAS (Patidar Anamat Andolan) but KAPAAS (cotton).

Overall the mood & results during this election where BJP won a small majority I think was best encapsulated by the following two catchphrases among people:

1.     “Naraaz hain par gaddar nahin” (We are unhappy but not traitors) &

2.     We want BJP to come back but with lower majority so that it is less arrogant than before

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR CONGRESS

Inspite of the loss the Gujarat results would have surely brought much needed cheer to the supporters of Congress & especially those of Rahul Gandhi. Rahul has presided over a very long list of Congress defeats/debacles & whose best electoral achievement to date had been winning 21/80 in Uttar Pradesh in 2009 Lok Sabha elections. He would have liked the win in Gujarat to be his signature moment announcing his arrival on the national stage & his elevation to Congress party president. This time around to his credit he has remained focused during the entire election campaign while staying on message. This should help build up his credibility as a serious politician in the eyes of the opposition who is looking for a central figure to take on Narendra Modi & BJP juggernaut. No other party except the Congress has either the pan India presence or the organization that Congress has to challenge the BJP hegemony that exists right now. Prashant Jha (Hindustan Times) in his excellent book “How the BJP wins” has mentioned about the “index of opposition unity” as a major factor in how the BJP fares vs opposition in elections. When opposition parties’ fight united like the Mahagathbandhan in Bihar in 2015 the BJP can’t do well. In Gujarat due to the absence of strong leaders Rahul Gandhi co-opted the help of caste leaders Hardik, Jignesh & Alpesh to improve the Congress vote share & chances of winning. Similarly he needs to bring together various likeminded opposition parties such as NCP, SP, BSP, Left (CPI & CPM), DMK, TMC, etc. under a common umbrella. Recently ex-BJP man Arun Shourie who was a minister under Vajpayee but now is a Modi detractor said that opposition needs to field just 1 common candidate in every seat in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections to defeat the BJP. There was a rumor recently that SP BSP & Congress had agreed a formula where 80 seats of UP will be divided as follows for 2019 (SP 30, BSP 30 & Cong 20). Not sure on how much credibility to put in this rumor as question remains if Mayawati can put aside the events of June 2, 1995 (which could be the subject of an entirely new blog by itself J) to join hands with the SP. A further question is that when these parties & Congress sit down to hash out seat sharing agreements can all the leaders leave their ego at the door? Can Rahul facilitate seat sharing with a large set of parties when everyone will want their own “fair share”? History is littered with many examples where negotiations broke down resulting in parties fighting separately with disastrous consequences. Rahul showing some tactical sharpness played the “soft Hindutva” card in Gujarat with his temple visits to shed the pro-minority image of his party. But how will they play out in UP & Bihar when he links up with SP & RJD who have a huge Muslim base.

A favorite word of Congress party in the recent past after suffering yet another defeat was that it needs to do some “introspection”. This time around there has been some jubilation even in a defeat at making BJP work very hard for a narrow victory.  Some in the media have declared this as a “victory” for the Congress inspite of coming second. All this fanfare about a “moral victory” is a bit overblown as there still needs to be more introspection on its part. How did it not win when the BJP was facing a perfect storm of 22 years of anti-incumbency, a section of BJP’s alliance was in revolt, rural distress & unhappiness among its core base traders. Granted Congress party which was “left for dead” after the rebellion in July did manage a good revival & in that case it is a vast improvement but it still didn’t result in what truly matters in politics: victory. I.e. Patient who was bedridden & left for dead did indeed get up & started walking briskly but has some work to do before he catches up to his running competitor.

Lessons are many from this defeat. One it needs to develop strong regional leaders in all states. This election has shown that it can take support from outside groups like the three young leaders in Gujarat but “piggybacking” on them won’t win you elections. You need to develop your own local organization on the ground including promoting strong local leaders. Simply having people angry doesn’t win you elections; you still need a good ground game to take them to the booth. Rahul now that he has been elevated needs identify & promote strong regional leaders (like Capt. Amarinder Singh in Punjab). In upcoming assembly elections in Rajasthan & MP there needs to be elevation of one single leader to take charge of party 12 months in advance of next election. Putting off naming someone till last moment leaves you vulnerable to be internally sabotaged at last moment by rival faction just before the election. Naming some in advance gives you log time to pacify a disgruntled leader. Congress needs to control factional wars in both Rajasthan (Ashok Gehlot vs Sachin Pilot) & MP (Jyotiraditya Scindia vs Kamal Nath vs Digvijay Singh) to retain a possible chance of wresting these states back from BJP control.

Second as many surveys have pointed out that the increase in vote share of Congress in Gujarat was partly due to anti BJP sentiment & was a “protest vote” i.e. not really a pro Congress vote. This vote share increase could be a sporadic surge which could very well return to the BJP in next election.People in surveys & in talks with journalists said that they will vote for Congress this time around as they are disgusted with the local BJP leadership & want to teach them a lesson. But in 2019 will vote for Narendra Modi which means that the increase in support the Congress must not take for granted but continuously work to flip for disgruntled voters till 2019.

Thirdly hard questions need to be asked as to why they still suffer from a trust deficit with the voters.  Rahul needs to draw up an alternate vision of the Congress party for the country & how it differs from BJP. Serious thought needs to put in to what will click with the masses to win them over. By now many opposition politicians can attest to (like Arvind Kejriwal) that simply opposing Modi for what he does doesn’t weaken him but only makes him stronger. For e.g. when tough questions were being asked initially of BJP’s governance in Gujarat, BJP was on back foot. Once Mani Shankar Aiyar’s personal comment on Modi was made the whole game changed & focus shifted from issues on ground in Gujarat to Modi himself.

Fourthly even though Congress attacked BJP well over the last 3 -6 months it has to be a 5 year effort. It can’t simply afford to go dormant over 4.5 years of the term & simply wake up in last 6 months & expect to win elections.

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR BJP

BJP did manage to scrape through this time against extremely heavy headwinds. Their leaders in public were saying that they were never too worried about the result but many of them would certainly had a full blown panic attack on the 18^th between 9:08 to 9:20am when the Congress was actually leading in more seats than BJP. This time around they were give a real run for their money by the Congress this time around which is not necessarily a bad thing as it helps remove any complacency & over confidence. Many in the media have mentioned this to be a “defeat” inspite of winning the election. There is some merit to the argument that it doesn’t look well when in the home state of the PM the ruling party barely scrapes through. But on the other hand many who have been calling this as the “beginning of the end” of the BJP hegemony in India are reading too much into a single result. BJP supporters have defended against any such observations spouting facts like they did manage to win becoming only the 2^nd party to win a state 6 times in a row (only behind CPM’s 7 victories in a row in West Bengal). I personally believe  is not a case of “flashing red lights” for the BJP government like many in the BJP opposition would like you to believe but there are sure signs of caution “flashing yellow lights”.

As I mentioned earlier rural distress big issue which can no longer swept under rug. While talking about the Gujarat elections with others I consistently talked about the big concern that BJP could possibly actually lose if it completely collapses in the rural areas. Almost everyone scoffed at that idea that BJP could possibly lose in Gujarat & must have surely thought I have completely lost it. I am not sure how many appreciate the fact that it came perilously close to losing i.e. losing 7 more seats in rural areas & it would have been toast. Luckily for BJP the damage was limited to just one region Saurashtra.

Farmers in rural areas as always are at the mercy of rain, commodity market prices, middle men, inclement weather patterns, etc. On top of that due to the lower MSP (minimum support price) for their crops they don’t make enough for their crops to cover the costs of production. This causes them to sink into debt & despair. This has been a problem not only in Gujarat but has been seen across the country. There have few farmer protests but uptill now haven’t been in the news much which I am sure is going to change going forward.  Modi who had promised to double the farmer’s income by 2022 has come under severe criticism by the farmers who are not happy with their current situation. They believe that they been brazenly lied to by the PM. Gujarat is one of the biggest industrialized/urban state & BJP might have caught a lucky break. As the election cycle moves to other more rural states this has the potential to be a huge headache for the BJP. The concern is that if this discontent spreads to other states the fortunes of BJP in 2019 could quickly take a sharp downward turn. One must not forget that after the resounding win for Cong in 2009, in the last 3 years of things so out of hand that there was no way they could regain any sort of control on the narrative.  Arun Jaitely the Finance Minister to his credit after the Gujarat verdict has said that they need to analyze the reason for their underperformance. It is given now the budget in Feb 2018 will be a populist rural friendly budget where a strong focus will be given on the rural sector. MSP’s will also be expected to be increased though this part where it becomes tricky due to inflation concerns. There is a theory out there that one of reasons government is keeping MSP low is to keep inflation under control.

Shivam Vij in his article 2 months ago describes this (inflation control) as the single minded aim of the present govt. (even at cost of high growth) which is exacerbating rural distress. Most people think that UPA-2 lost the narrative due to the corruption but actual survey data shows it to be high inflation. Demonetization he says might have an unintended side effect of suppressing inflation due to liquidity being sucked out of the system.

Many in the rural sector think that Modi as pandering to his natural BJP support base of urban voters by keeping inflation low at expense of rural voters. Now if as many expect there will increase in MSP plus other benefits given to the rural farmers how will the staunch BJP urban voters react when inflation rises? This delicate balancing act will be the true “agnipariskha” (trial by fire) of the govt. over the last 15 months of its term. Can it keep placate the rural electorate (with higher MSP, sops, benefits, etc.) while not allowing the urban electorate to get upset (with higher inflation)? If Modi succeeds in this that nothing short of miracle will prevent the BJP from winning a 2^nd term.

Another issue brought to the fore has been youth disenchantment especially in the rural areas. As I said in previous blog that even the biggest Modi detractors don’t deny that there has been VIKAS (Development) in Gujarat in past 15 years. However I want to reemphasize for umpteenth time that old motto of BSP: BIJLI SADAK & PAANI (electricity, roads & water) no longer clicks with the youth especially. The youth is aspirational & wants to better their life & is looking for upward mobility. Modi rode this aspirational wave to a landslide in 2014 general election. BSP has been replaced with 3 new keywords NKG : Naukri, Kamai & Ghar (job, income & house). Seeing farming as a dead end job many communities like rural Patidar want reservation due to lack of private jobs. They want the “safety net” of guaranteed government job and/or reservation in colleges. I agree that with several economists say govt. should not be in job creation for it best left to private sector which is more efficient & dynamic. Though it can create facilitate the right environment to boost job growth which uplifts all sections of the society. Failure on this point could cause more Hardik Patel type of youth unrest movement organically sprouting up in other states adding to the cup of existing woes for the BJP government.

Two of the big schemes of government have been building roads: Bharamtmala Yojna & building houses PM Awas Yojna. I strongly believe that government should consider using MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee) scheme to employ unemployed low skilled people to build both roads & houses under the above mentioned schemes. This would not only increase rural employment but also reduce dependence on agriculture & rural distress.

To counter the caste politics of regional parties & Congress, BJP works on consolidating the Hindu vote by whatever means possible including creating anxiety/fear in minds of Hindus vs minorities (Muslims) and/or dominant political caste (Yadavs in UP/Bihar). But the rainbow Hindu coalition of BJP that Amit Shah has created was shown to be under stress in Gujarat with the Patels moving away. This will be a constant tussle going forward between regional parties who will try splitting on basis of caste against BJP while BJP trying to consolidate them on basis of religion against regional parties/Congress. If the regional parties end up succeeding in fracturing the so called rainbow alliance BJP strategy of polarization on lines of religion won’t work anymore.

Another challenge on the horizon is the state elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan & Chhattisgarh in end of 2018 where BJP is in power. For past 3.5 years Modi has brilliantly rallied the masses behind him portraying the opposition incumbent governments in the states as being corrupt, partisan & up to no good. It will fascinate to watch as how he makes the transition from being the challenger to the incumbent. He can no longer rail against either the state or central government as both are with BJP now. Could he face problems (like in Gujarat (where it was the party in power) or will he modify his style to the changing demands?

NEXT 500 DAYS:

I am sure most of you didn’t realize that it is only approximately 500 days to the next general election in 2019 J

One of the complaints over past few years was that the Congress had no core constituency it could rely on. Maybe Gujarat has shown that it could work on the rural voters as its natural constituency to bring down BJP’s nos. in Lok Sabha. However without making any decent inroads in BJP’s urban strongholds coming back to power is a pipe dream.

As Prashant Jha (Hindustan Times) describes in his book “How BJP wins” that Modi considers himself as “senapati” & for him every election campaign is a “battle”. He puts all he has in the election campaign which might appear as desperate to some but that’s just how he operates. Rahul & Congress party thus faces a relentless machine in Modi which also requires them to significantly up their effort to be in the game. Come rain or shine Congress & Rahul have to consistently keep hitting BJP’s weak spots day in & day out without any breaks/any sort of let ups over the next 15 months for there to be a substantial effect in 2019 general election. This is an arduous uphill climb where there wouldn’t be overnight success.  The lead the BJP & allies have in terms of seats (334 = 282 BJP + 52 allies) is so huge that even a loss of 60 seats still leaves them in majority. This illustrates how tall of an order it is too defeat the NDA government. Congress leaders in Gujarat before the election privately admitted that more likely possibility was to push BJP below 100 to embarrass it. Similarly a more realistic goal in 2019 given the huge buffer NDA starts with would to push BJP down to 200-220 range where its allies either abandon it or demand more control in functioning of government thus crippling Modi’s autonomy that enjoys currently.

For all of BJP’s woes there has to be a course correction which is not out of the realm for this govt. They have proven to adaptive like they did after the 2015 defeats in Delhi & Bihar & recent modifications in GST after getting feedback from unhappy traders. But this has to be an “inflection point” just like the GDP numbers which have continuously going down for 6 straight quarter but now have to trend up. Same holds true for economic growth & job creation. The hits to the economy due to Demo + GST which hit the informal sector badly leave no room for radical reforms till after the 2019 election. So the BJP will have limited tools in its arsenal to ensure that the economy is in full gear come summer of 2019.

As Prashant Jha (Hindustan Times) has said that Modi is still immensely popular 3.5 years into his term as people don’t doubt his INTENT & INTEGRITY. As one senior BJP leader told Nistula Hebbar (The Hindu) “there are four stages of an electorate being upset with you. Stage one, is that the person is upset but will still vote for you. Stage two is that he/she is upset and may consider an alternative but still vote for you, the third that an the upset voter will stay home, the fourth that the upset voter will vote against you no matter the alternative. In Gujarat we were in the middle of the second and third stage and it was Prime Minister Modi who made the critical difference of winning our voters back.” Modi has been the biggest asset of BJP over the past 3.5 years & have been heavily dependent on him especially in closing stages of the campaign. They can’t afford to have people starting to tune him out if things go south.

 One thing which I believe will work for the BJP is the hard miles Amit Shah was putting in even when BJP was sweeping all states. He has been covering lakhs of kilometers making forays into the East (Orissa & West Bengal & North East) & South (TN, Kerala & Telangana) in bid to expand the footprint of BJP in states where it is traditionally weak. During the 2014 landslide 216/282 BJP Seats came from just 8 states: UP, MP, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan & Maharashtra loosely defined as the Hindi heartland. Since they had alliance partners in Bihar & Maharashtra I will exclude them for now. In the 6 remaining states BJP won 90 to 100% of all seats on offer. He knows that irrespective of Modi’s popularity in 2019 there are bound to be certain losses as when one wins close to 100% of seats the only way possible is down. To compensate for the losses from these high strike rate states in the Hindi heartland he has been on a relentless exercise to win compensatory seats in new states to make for any possible losses from the Hindi heartland.

After the BJP’s landslide win UP, Omar Abdullah famously remarked that opposition should prepare for 2024 general election (implying that 2019 was a done deal in favor of BJP). This election has shown that while BJP & Modi are still a formidable fighting machine but they are by no means invincible. Urban areas seem firmly in BJP hands right now but rural areas are the BJP’s Achilles heel. BJP has to work hard to relieve rural distress or it could possibly get ugly in rural seats across the country. I am sure every BJP supporter needs no reminder about the India Shining campaign disaster in 2004. This however is not to be interpreted as BJP losing in 2019 as it still a heavy favorite but now the opposition at least has some chance to stop the BJP juggernaut. I would say that the odds post Gujarat have slightly shifted from “Solid Lock for BJP” to “Strong Lean for BJP”.

Gujarat Elections 2017

On December 9th & 14th the voters in Gujarat will go to the polling booth to vote on the assembly elections to select a new government. Politics of Gujarat is fascinating due to the frequently changing governments & CM’s (Chief Ministers) over its 57 year old history. Due to the quite recent 13 years of uninterrupted term of Narendra Modi  (2001 – 2014) most have forgotten about the unstable times of past where CM’s use to come & go at the drop of a hat.  Out of the 16 chief ministers that Gujarat has had, only 3 – Hitendra Desai, Madhavsinh Solanki and Modi completed a full five-year term. The average tenure of the remaining 13 chief ministers comes to poor 2.5 years shows that the CM’s chair in Gujarat has been a “crown of thorns”.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF GUJARAT POLITICS

Congress party was in power in Gujarat from 1960 (creation of state) to 1990 (except between 1975 to 1980: Jan Sangh). The election in1990 saw a 3 way split of seats among Congress, JD (Janta Dal) & BJP. Chimanbhai Patel (JD) formed a coalition government with BJP & was elected as CM. However in late 1990 due to the parting of ways between BJP & JD at national level (which led to fall of the VP Singh government in Centre) this local coalition in Gujarat too collapsed. Chimanbhai quickly negotiated a new alliance with Congress & continued to be the CM. Before the end of the term in 1995 the JD (Gujarat) faction merged with the Congress party.

During the 1995 elections BJP swept to power & Keshubhai Patel was elected as its CM. Shankersinh Vaghela who was one of the architects of the 1995 victory along with Narendra Modi was passed over for the CM’s post. Vaghela gradually saw his influence wane in the local politics of Gujarat. He suspected the cause of this not only to be the CM Keshubhai Patel but also Modi who he suspected of having an outsized influence on the government, inspite of Modi not being a part of the actual cabinet. These buildups of resentment lead to an eventual outright rebellion where Shankersinh who is affectionately called as “Bapu” by his followers, took 47 MLA’s to Khajurao in neighboring Madhya Pradesh. As a compromise to quell the rebellion between Keshubhai & Vaghela groups, Modi was shunted out to national politics as a party general secretary & Suresh Mehta (a neutral not belonging either to Keshubhai or Vaghela camps) was appointed as CM. However this brief peace lasted barely a year when Vaghela split from the BJP to follow his own party: RJP. He did become CM eventually with help from Congress in 1997 & the RJP + Congress coalition government lasted little over a year when in 1998 he called for fresh elections. However in the 1998 elections RJP was thoroughly routed & BJP rode back to power with Keshubhai again at the helm of affairs in Gandhinagar.  This term unlike previous one was largely bereft of intra party squabbles but then towards the end of the term there were accusations of corruption, poor governance & administration. The poor relief & recovery response after the devastating 2001 Republic Day earthquake added to the existing woes of the government. But the bigger “political earthquake” was to come 9 months later. In September 2001 a by election was to be held in Sabarmati assembly seat which was contained within LK Advani’s Lok Sabha constituency. Sabarmati: a BJP bastion which BJP hadn’t lost since 1985 in a shocker saw the BJP candidate lose to Congress by a margin of over 19,000 votes. This set of the alarm bells in BJP high command in New Delhi who acted swiftly to act before it was too late. LK Advani succeeded in installing his favorite Narendra Modi as CM of Gujarat.

Less than 6 months later on February 27, 2002 a coach of the Sabarmati Express carrying kar sevaks returning from Ayodhya was burned in Godhra. This led to massive rioting statewide over next few weeks in which ~1,000 people were killed. The government was accused of being negligent and complicit to quell the rioting in the aftermath of the Godhra tragedy. Facing intense criticism from both outside & inside the party for both being hostile towards Muslims & the handling of situation during riots Modi dissolved the government, calling for fresh elections in state a year ahead of schedule. Due to the riots with the Hindu majority consolidated firmly behind him he went to win in a landslide in 2002.  

I won’t go into the modern history of Gujarat politics post 2002 election as most are well versed in it and have good memory of it. Over next 12 years Modi was attacked constantly by Congress & other in opposition especially over events in 2002 but he easily swatted away all challenges with great ease & continued to be in power winning the assembly elections twice again in 2007 & 2012. Modi has been an exception rather than the norm in terms of longevity being the CM of Gujarat. He has consistently beaten off various challengers from Congress from both local & national Congress leaders.After presiding over the historic win in 2014 Lok Sabha election, he moved to New Delhi giving over the reins of Gujarat to Anandiben Patel.

BJP has been in power for 22 years straight (albeit with couple years under splinter faction by Vaghela). In the modern history of India other than the 34 year rule of the CPM in West Bengal, I cannot recall any other party that has been in power this long. This not only speaks volumes among the strength of BJP (Vis a Vis Modi/Shah) but also to the weakness of Congress to put up a stiffer challenge over these 22 years. Congress party in Gujarat now for quite some time has been riddled with massive factionalism. It has a mix of leaders from original Congressmen to ex BJP men like Vaghela & not to forget former Janta Dal members. The multiple power centers do no good to the party at a time when Congress requires a strong leader to counter Modi. Many lower Congressmen have privately complained that for the past few elections Shankersinh Vaghela, Shaktisinh Gohil, Bharathsinh Solanki & Arjun Modvadia play a round robin game among themselves. After leading Congress to a defeat one resigns & hands over the baton the next who will be in power till next election which they lose again, after which they resign & pass the leadership baton to the 3rd one & so on & so forth, but just among the four of them. Congress has practically thrown the “kitchen sink” at Modi over the years but Modi has outfoxed them in every election so far. This time around to unify the party under his command, Shankersinh Vaghela made request to Rahul Gandhi to hand over reins of Gujarat Congress to him. He claimed in an interview that Rahul Gandhi promised a year before election to do so. But later for reasons unknown this promise was not kept leading to his rebellion & eventual expulsion from the party. Many political analysts feel that this was huge missed opportunity for the Congress which could use the leadership of a political veteran like Vaghela this time around. Vaghela & Modi came up together through the ranks in RSS/BJP & are very well acquainted with each other strengths & weaknesses. Vaghela & Modi are also said to have intricate knowledge of all the 13,000 villages of Gujarat & the caste composition in all 182 assembly constituencies. Vaghela who knows inside out the BJP strategy from prior campaigns was the type of street fighter who could go head to head in bare knuckles fight with the BJP. By not declaring a CM candidate Congress left BJP an opportunity to instead portray this election as a national Modi vs Rahul fight vs. a possible at local level Vaghela vs current CM Vijay Rupani (who is not considered a political heavyweight) fight. Many claim that instead of projecting a strong leader at local level they have propped up 3 outsiders: Hardik Patel, Alpesh Thakor & Jignesh Mevani.

NEW ENTRANTS : HARDIK PATEL, ALPESH THAKOR & JIGNESH MEVANI

Hardik Patel in 2015 setup the PAAS (Patidar Anamat Andolan Samiti) as an organization to push for reservation for Patels. He felt that with the rapid industrialization & urbanization of the economy in Gujarat that the Patels who were in agriculture were getting left behind. The movement caught fire & gained massive support virtually overnight. After a huge rally in Ahmedabad he was arrested by police as he did not have permission to stay on the grounds after the rally. The grounds were cleared by the police after a lathi charge. These events led to wide spread violent clashes between police & his supporters which led to both loss of life & property over the next few days. BJP Government faced with intense criticism on the handling of the situation instituted a committee to look into the demands of Patidars. They even proposed a 10% quote under EBC (economically Backward Classes) but it was struck down by the courts as unconstitutional. Separately case was filed against Hardik Patel for sedition & he was forced out of exile from Gujarat for 6 months. This led him to believe that BJP government will not fulfill his demands & declared that he will work to oust the BJP government in Gujarat in 2017.

Simultaneously when the Patidar agitation was ongoing there was a worry among OBC’s about dilution of their share in the 27% OBC quote due to the possible inclusion of Patels in it. Alpesh Thakore an OBC Thakore leader came to prominence raising this issue. At first he was opposed to the Patidar agitation & declared that there shouldn’t be any change to their representation in the quota. Later he merged his effort with that of Hardik Patel with common aim of defeating the BJP in 2017. He claimed that lakhs of his supporters asked him to formally join Congress to ensure his communities’ interests are preserved.

Third of these newcomers was Jignesh Mevani a Dalit lawyer & activist. Last year after Dalits were beaten in Una for skinning dead cows by cow vigilantes he led a protest march of few thousand Dalits. All these 3 new entrants have joined hands with single aim to dislodge the BJP from power in Gandhinagar.

SENTIMENT ON THE GROUND:

The 22 year rule of BJP has certainly led to a “fatigue factor” among the electorate. Patels are visibly upset with BJP & have been the most vocal about it. While the Patels in the urban areas have not done badly during the past few years the Patels in the rural areas who are predominantly in agriculture feel that they have suffered. The Patel unrest is mainly in North Gujarat & Saurashtra where they are engaged in cotton & groundnut farming. After suffering crop failures few years ago this time around even with a bumper crop they have issue with a very low MSP (minimum support price) they are getting for their crop. Seeing agriculture as “dead end job” the youth in the community want to move to pursue professional course/degrees like medicine, engineering, etc. This is where the issue of reservation comes up as they can’t get into colleges with same ease as those in reservation categories due to them being in the general admission category. Furthermore those do get into colleges say that the private institutions charge an “arm & a leg” to study & when they graduate there aren’t enough jobs in rural areas. There is also deep seething anger at the 14 Patidar youths killed in police firing in 2015 & that no one has been brought to justice for it. On top of it they feel that the BJP high command is anti-Patel as they first removed Keshubhai Patel to make way for Modi (2001) & then removed another Patel CM Anandibehn Patel to install Vijay Rupani for CM ( at behest of Amit Shah). Shivam Vij (an independent journalist) a couple of months before the election visited Gujarat to get the sense of the ground. A Patel who described his outright hatred for BJP to him in following words: “Not that I love the Congress. They are fathers of Muslims. Voting for the Congress is like blinding yourself in one eye. But this time, I will do that because I want to blind the BJP in both its eyes!” This is quite surprising to many as Patels have been the bedrock of the BJP coalition for past 20+ years.

This however shouldn’t be interpreted that all Patels are going to abandon the BJP. Multiple sources have reported that they don’t expect the Patels to vote en masse for against BJP & there will be divisions among their vote. Patel voters where the ones in higher income percentile and/or whom are in urban areas still want to stay with BJP as they have done well while the ones in lower income percentile/rural areas want to switch their votes for Congress. Also another interesting division is that many of the older Patels who have experienced the Congress rule of which they don’t have fond memories & deep distrust will continue to vote for BJP while the youth who grew up mostly during the 22 year BJP rule want to vote for a change i.e. for Congress. Even among the non-Patel farmers this time around there is anger regarding farming distress that I mentioned above. A word I keep hearing again & again in the interviews of reporters with people especially in rural areas is that BJP government has become “ghamndi”(arrogant). Many feel that that the present government doesn’t care about their day to day issues & even though they have no love for Congress just to teach a BJP a lesson they will vote for Congress. Some BJP voters have expressed a strange sentiment: They want the BJP to retain power but with lower majority to cut them down to size. This is the first time in my life that i heard voters saying that while they want their party to win the election but nevertheless with smaller majority!

Congress has tried to latch onto the disenchantment among voters a few months ago with the “Vikas Gando Thayo Che” (Development has become mad). It did gain enough traction that Amit Shah asked party workers to “not fall for campaign of lies by opposition”. BJP the absolute of masters of social media were at the receiving end for the first time ever.  Rahul Gandhi who had famously dismissed social media as a tool in 2014 general elections had woken up to the power of it & reformed the Congress social media cell this year to get back in the social media/online game. Patidar youth the backbone of the Patidar agitation have a huge proportion of cell phone penetration. To weave their own narrative they have been said to be very active on WhatsApp, FB, etc. trying to showcase the shortcoming of the BJP government. All this caught BJP caught on the back foot and they were losing control of the narrative which in the past they were masters of. With the opposition having their own communication network they couldn’t weave their own message through traditional media sources like before. Later on they came up with a counter media campaign “Hu chu Vikas, Hu chu Gujarat” (I am development, I am Gujarat) on social media campaign to undo the damage from the Congress & Patidar.

 In face of the attacks on its governance BJP has tried to project itself in a positive light by trying to showcase the roads, power & water development when they were in power. The development of roads & in power sector is acknowledged even the most ardent BJP detractors. Water from the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada has indeed being sent to the arid regions of Saurashtra & North Gujarat easing the water crisis for many who are happy. But at the same time others who aren’t near the canal network to take advantage of this irrigation feel left out & betrayed by the BJP government. Gujarat becoming  more of an urbanized state plus the people especially becoming more aspirational wanting jobs & income the allure of simple infrastructure development like bijli, sadak & paani (electricity, roads & water) is seem to be waning. Hence the vikas message from BJP doesn’t have same resonance with voters like before putting BJP on the back foot this time around.

Post joining of Alpesh into the Congress party formally & Hardik in an informal alliance with Congress & Jignesh contesting as an independent from Vadgam where Congress has no candidate (i.e. supporting him indirectly) the BJP has tried to discredit Hardik/Alpesh/Jignesh by trying to paint the picture that they were not interested in reservation or rights for that community but simply opportunists looking for entry into politics. This did create some fissures in opposition ranks but it is to be seen how many of these BJP defectors returned to the BJP.

Gujarat being a highly entrepreneurial state has huge number of small traders & businessmen. Many of them are not happy with the twin shocks of DEMO & GST in under a year which has affected their business. Inspite of the difficulties most of them will vote for BJP due to the TINA factor (There is no alternative)

A lesson from the UP debacle was that Congress has the pro-Muslim/minority label associated with it. Rahul Gandhi to pedal the “soft Hindutva” image to ensure the Hindu electorate isn’t turned off by visiting multiple temples in Gujarat. This has caused the BJP to attack him as they would prefer the Hindu vote consolidate behind them. They have dropped hints that if Congress returns to power there will communal disharmony as many people still have negative perceptions of when Congress was in power last. However for most this time around the 2002 riots is barely an issue this time around & hasn’t struck a chord with the electorate.

There is criticism from many quarters that Congress due to lack of single strong leader has outsourced the heavy lifting work of taking on the mighty BJP in Gujarat to Hardik, Alpesh & Jignesh. Local Congress has retreated into the background & left it to these 3 to campaign extensively across the state. They have their own loyal set of highly passionate supporters who are working hard to defeat the BJP. But to appease these outside factions few tickets have been distributed to them which have not gone well with the rank & file Congressmen. In some constituencies this had led to a situation where sulking Congressmen have given up on election campaigning & left if to the Patidar workers to carry on the fight against BJP.  While in others as per reports in North Gujarat (a bastion of Congress strength in the last election in 2012) Congress has to deal with rebel candidates who refused to withdraw nominations.  A mix of neglect & defeats over the years has badly hollowed out the booth management/”ground game” for the Congress party & pales in shadow to the structure setup by Amit Shah for BJP. Though there are some reports that Congress has started to work on this aspect in more detail this time around to boost its turnout.  Further compounding the problems of Congress party is the reports that the party being short on cash/money has asked candidates to mostly pay for campaign expenses from their own pockets.  This puts them at a disadvantage with BJP with is reported to be flush with cash due to its recent winning streak.

THE NUMBERS GAME:

Gujarat is the 4th most urbanized & 3^rd most industrialized state in the country. A huge chunk (84/182 i.e. 46% of seats 84/182 are in urban areas. Here the BJP did very well in 2012 winning 71 seats (compared to just 12 seats for Congress). Congress was slightly ahead of BJP in rural areas netting 49 seats vs 44 for BJP. During the local body elections in late 2015 just after the Patidar agitations Congress swept the panchayat elections in rural areas while BJP was victorious in the city municipalities. With the anger among rural electorate especially farmers, question is how many seats can the Congress pickup in rural areas to close the overall gap. For BJP can they sweep again in the urban areas winning close to 85% of seats on offer like last time to ensure overall reduction in numbers vs 2012 are kept to a minimum?

Looking at a region wise breakdown BJP did very well in Central, South & Saurashtra while North Gujarat was the only place where Congress did better than BJP.

There is heavy concentration of Patels in Saurashtra & also in North Gujarat where the Patidar movement originated from.  BJP did not too well in 2012 so impact there could possibly be minimum. Question is how much damage the Patidar can cause to the BJP prospects in Saurashtra which has the biggest chunk of 58 seats (48 Saurashtra + 6 Kutch).

Looking at vote share taking a baseline to compare against is slightly tricky as in 2012 Assembly election where BJP was ahead by 9% but in the recent 2014 election BJP was up by a gigantic 26%.  Usually the vote share during a national election & local election would vary due to national vs local issues getting prominence in both elections. There is some research done recently by Roshan Kishore of Hindustan Times where he said that there is usually a dip in vote% of the party which gets maximum share in a Lok Sabha in the next assembly elections. For keeping the comparison at an assembly level let’s assume the 2012 elections as baseline for now. The 9% difference is still a massive delta in a bipolar fight & this shows in the seats won where BJP won 115 while the Congress could only manage 61.  Now due to clustering of votes in some areas, third party/independent votes, etc. usually a 2% or higher vote share advantage vs. your opponent is required. Hence to win the election this time around Congress would need a swing of atleast 6+% in its favor to win the election.

CASTE POLITICS & ALLIANCES

Congress reached their zenith of power in 1985 when they won 149 seats (a record that still stands today). The architect of that landslide was Madhavsinh Solanki who the formed the famous KHAM coalition (Kshatriya Harijan Adivasi Muslim) coalition. This shift in power didn’t sit well with many of the other castes including Patels. They coalesced around BJP an up comer in Gujarat politics in the 80’s. Eventually in 1995 their influence in Gujarat politics was fully cemented when Keshubhai Patel was sworn in as the CM. During the Modi years after 2002 riots the Hindu vote consolidation around BJP & the KHAM model for Congress fell apart. This time around Congress is trying to not only revive the KHAM model but actually widen it with the updated KHAM + P model i.e. KHAM + P (Patels). The basic premise is to woo disaffected Patels including Hardik Patel to cross the finish line as a winner with this new caste combo. As per some estimates Patels (the bedrock of BJP for past 20+ years) account for 20% of the overall BJP vote share. One thing is for certain & has been reported by people on both sides that they haven’t voted as a single block ever in the past & won’t do so either this time around (i.e. All Patels didn’t vote for BJP in 2012 & all won’t vote for Congress in 2017) . The million dollar question here is that how many who voted for BJP in 2012 will cross over to Congress in 2017. From surveys & feedback from reporters the numbers varies wildly from 30 to 50%. Now time for a guesstimate on my part. Assume half of Patel BJP voters vote for Congress this time around. So this would transfer 5% of votes from BJP to Congress which makes the new vote between Cong & BJP a virtual tie. Does these combined with BJP weakness in rural areas among non-Patel's mean Congress is in pole position to win this time around? No one knows the answer to this including yours truly. But before we consider this scenario in detail please consider the following.

Firstly is the chemistry of the new so called KHAM + P alliance. During the KHAM years in the 1980’s when Congress extended reservation to the OBC’s there was friction between the many of the upper caste Patels & OBC’s  including couple of riots in 1981 & 1985. Some observers doubt the strength of the alliance due to the inherent caste contradictions in the alliance. How will the transfer of votes happen from Patidar voters to Cong OBC candidate & from the Kshatriya OBC voter to Cong Patidar candidates? I.e. what is transferability of votes between the communities that were on opposite sides of the political spectrum? The youth is attracted to Hardik Patel but many of the elders are either wary of the tie up with Alpesh/OBC’s and/or Congress party.

BJP to counter the Patidar movement has given 57/182 seats to Patels (10 higher than last time) while Congress had fielded 65/182 Patels (8 higher vs 2012). Since many of seats have a Patel vs Patel fight they had secured a high representation in the new assembly even before voting begins (much higher compared to their 15% of overall population in Gujarat)

 Next I move on to the most fascinating part of this election: the chess match between BJP & Congress: the moves & countermoves

Gujarat has 27 seats reserved for Scheduled Tribes many of which are Adivasi’s. The Adivasi belt in South Gujarat has been a traditional Congress stronghold (Congress winning 16 seats in 2012). BJP had organized Vanvasi Kalyan Kendras in many Adivasi areas to woo over this core constituency. So BJP is trying to break the KHAM + P model by removing the Adivasi’s from it (i.e KHM + P). Congress seeing these moves from BJP has aligned with the ex JD(U) MLA Chotubhai Vasava (whose crucial vote allowed Ahmed Patel to retain his seat in Rajya Sabha earlier this year). Chotubhai has created his own party Gujarat Tribal Party & fielded 5 candidates where Congress has not fielded anyone. This is to consolidate the entire ST vote towards one candidate.

As Prashant Jha (Hindustan Times) describes in detail in his book “How the BJP Wins” in its winning streak across nation during the course of last 3 years BJP has gone after capturing state the non-dominant OBC vote. After the rise of OBC’s post Mandal the politically dominant OBC communities like the Yadavs in UP & Bihar monopolized all the benefits to their communities. Hence this led to feeling of being “left behind & ignored” by the other OBC communities. Amit Shah pulled together an alliance of traditional BJP supporters in upper caste plus these politically non-dominant OBC/Dalit castes to form a broad social coalition which has led BJP to multiple victories. Similar to other state elections one shouldn’t underestimate that BJP’s ability to try to round up votes from the other OBC castes (excluding Kshatriyas who are traditional Congress supporters) to create a new rainbow coalition in Gujarat. If BJP wins on 18^th Dec this would one of the biggest factor of them all – COUNTER OBC CONSOLIDATION. There are some reports that BJP is trying to do this mind you quietly on the ground as of course they don’t want to alienate the remaining Patels left on their side.

X FACTORS: 3^rd Parties & Independents

Since the merger of Shankersinh’ s RJP with Congress in late 90’s elections in Gujarat have been mostly a head to head affair with the Congress & BJP. In the past three elections 3^rd party candidates & independents have been claiming around 12 – 13% of the vote. However these votes are scattered all over the place where no one party get more than 2-3% of the vote. Hence the vote share to seat conversion ratio is extremely poor where they all together pick up only 4-6 seats. 2012 saw a slight different dynamic where former Keshubhai Patel contested with his GPP party which got a good 3.6% votes statewide & a decent 8% in Saurashtra denting the prospects of few BJP & Congress candidates in this region.

This time around the major 3rd parties’ contestants are

AAP (Aam Aadmi Party) Contesting 33 seats (mostly urban)

NCP (Nationalist Congress Party) Contesting on 72 seats

Jan Vikalp Party : Contesting 76 seats (Shankersinh Vaghela’ s new outfit post exit from Congress)

A great article by Nistula Hebbar (The Hindu) describes that 35/182 (1 in every 5 seats) were won by margin of less than 5,000 votes: BJP 14, Cong 19 GPP 1 NCP 1(Note: Median winning average is 17,000 votes) As per a BJP source in article their analysis showed that in 16 seats the votes polled by GPP > margin of loss/victory which they are targeting this time around.

Doing my further analysis on the 2012 numbers I found that if we consider the winning margin to be <10,000 votes (Still way below the median margin of victory) the number of seats rises to 62/182 (1 in every 3 seats!)

Reason I am bringing these numbers is that a single 3^rd party candidate or even two could enter the fray easily pull 5,000 to 10,000 votes  from either faction of  voters & possibly end up changing the victor in that constituency. Prakash Jha (Hindustan Times) has mentioned about the “index of opposition unity” as a major factor in whether the BJP does well or not. When opposition parties’ fight united like the Mahagathbandhan in Bihar in 2015 the BJP can’t do well. Granted there are not major regional parties & this is not best example of the principle but nevertheless it could very well apply here where the large anti BJP vote could split more than 1 way (especially when BJP is facing visible anti-incumbency in Gujarat).

AAP after the debacle in Punjab was dithering on whether to contest in Gujarat or not but decided to take the first time plunge into Gujarat assembly politics. I am not sure contesting in urban areas a stronghold of BJP where most BJP seats have been won by huge margin (against an established party like Congress) makes sense.

NCP couldn’t reach a seat sharing agreement with the Congress & is contesting independently. They did have 2 MLAs in the outgoing assembly & did poll an impressive 14% vote share in the 12 seats they contested. No doubt this shows that they do have strengths in certain pockets of Gujarat but contesting 72 is an over stretch. In areas where they are not dominant this probably is going to help the BJP as it splits the anti BJP vote. An example of this is that NCP has fielded 9 candidates in Surat where there were significant Patidar & GST protests & noticeable anti BJP sentiment. 

Jan Vikalp Party is the new party formed by Shankersinh Vaghela’ s after his exit from the Congress party.  As he is on very good personal terms with Modi even after his exit from BJP in mid-90’s there was a rumor that he might rejoin BJP but that came to pass. He has put up 76 candidates in including a few in North & Gujarat where he enjoys significant following among several communities. He is still smarting from his exit from Congress earlier this year. As I mentioned before he was promised by Rahul to be made chief in charge of Gujarat election only to be denied that post later on. He suspects Ahmed Patel behind denying him the leadership of local party. This was alleged to be the reason behind the timing of his rebellion to coincide just before Ahmed Patel's Rajya Sabha elections. He is rumored to want to get back at the Congress Party by damaging their prospects in North & even possibly Central Gujarat where he has some clout.

Note: Hardik Patel in the early days of his agitation on asked if he would join Congress reportedly said that joining Congress would be suicidal due to the negative connotations in minds of many with the Congress symbol. This was partly seen to his aversion to confirming that he met top Congress leadership in a hotel in Ahmedabad. He says that he doesn’t ask his supporters to vote for Congress but asks his supporters to simply defeat the BJP. There is a dilemma that if he says vote for Congress he risks alienating his base (given their aversion to Congress) but if he tries to not say explicitly to vote for Congress, there could be a few possible voters who for whatever reason vote for one of the 3^rd parties & thus splitting the anti BJP vote away from Congress who is best suited to defeat BJP.

CONCLUSION

Congress to its credit has put up a much better campaign this time around than previous times. Rahul Gandhi has remained engaged during the whole election campaign visiting Gujarat frequently & continuously asking questions of the BJP government. Most of the Congress leadership has mostly avoided making any major gaffes like “maut ka saudagar” which could boomerang against it. BJP in part due to the spirited campaign from Congress & the young trio (Hardik, Alpesh, and Jignesh) plus anti-incumbency was feeling like playing on the back foot as there was no overarching narrative that was resonating with all. It is too early to get a sense of the impact of Mani Shankar Aiyer’s two back to back gaffe’s & Kapil Sibal controversy over request to postpone Ran Janmabhoomi case in Supreme Court which just happened over last few days but nevertheless gave BJP & especially Modi some narrative to pounce upon: Gujarat Asmita (pride) & slight of Congressmen against him. The election which was being fought mostly on caste lines now has the possible potential to get polarized on basis of religion favoring BJP.

For the opposition this is a unique experiment in India politics. It stills remains to be seen whether a disparate alliance of 3 novice caste based popular movements can seamlessly gel together with a seasoned political party albeit without a strong local leader. For e.g. in theory on paper you can have a strong team on paper with very good individual players. But if there is no chemistry within the team members & if there is no strong captain to ensure the team meshes well & performs during crunch time all this talent goes to waste. For the first time Congress is truly in the game in an election in Gujarat mostly due to anti-incumbency. For it to win it has to now make sure all the anger against BJP is actually translated into votes or all the efforts will be in vain. The Congress is belatedly putting efforts into booth management/”ground game” but the question is the anger against BJP so big that “Ground game” doesn’t matter. Everyone talked about in 2016 about Democrats having an advantage due to better “ground game” but simply got overwhelmed by Republicans who came out in larger numbers inspite of weaker “ground game”. If the Congress wins in PM Modi’s backyard it would be nothing short of a political earthquake which will resonate for some time to come. Some polls show them few % behind in the vote share behind BJP while others like CSDS show them basically tied with BJP (though I have some issues with the sampling weightage of CSDS poll which would be subject of whole another article) For it win key is Saurashtra (which has huge concentration of Patidar & rural farmers) where it hasn’t made any inroads in a long time. It has to maintain its lead in North Gujarat which was the epicenter of the youth movements. If not it will simply give up the wins in other areas of Gujarat. In South Gujarat it has to retain the tribal belt & try to wrest away seats in BJP stronghold of Surat which saw Patidar & GST protests. Another thing of paramount importance for Congress is to sweep the rural seats across the state where there is more anger & anti-incumbency while simultaneously trying to the flip the most vulnerable BJP held urban seats.

For the BJP even though their CM is Vijay Rupani their main campaigner is Narendra Modi. On the issue of Narendra Modi there is this strange dichotomy: CM Modi is held is very high regard even by some of his detractors but many are unhappy with the PM Modi (with regards to Demonetization & GST).  However as Prashant Jha notes that people don’t doubt the INTEGRITY & INTENT of Narendra Modi & hence many are willing to give the benefit of doubt. However if BJP loses there will be cracks in this larger than life personality cult of Narendra Modi. The same benefit however is not extended to the local state government which is unpopular for many. Many BJP workers have said that when Modi comes to visit Gujarat all these issues will be gone. Question here is that how many constituencies can Modi visit to change the mind of the disaffected voters? BJP voters when they go to vote will have which of the two on their mind: Narendra Modi (who they know isn’t coming back to Gandhinagar) or local BJP government (not the most popular one for some). BJP can afford to lose 23 seats overall & still retain power. Question is can it minimize the expected losses in Saurashtra? Can it wrest away some Adivasi/tribal seats in South Gujarat to compensate for some losses in Surat. Central Gujarat a bastion of BJP should remain intact for the most part & there is a possible pickup opportunity in Congress strongholds of Kheda & Anand where BJP finally wrested control of co-operatives from Congress. North Gujarat (even though it has strong OBC & Patel population) is the only region where Congress did better than BJP. If BJP can even marginally improve performance this should provide a cushion in case they a suffer setback in another region like Saurashtra. BJP over the years has become a party dominating the cities & doing not so well in the villages. An example of this is an eye opening statistic that nearly half of BJP’s seats were won just from cities of Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodara, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Junagadh, and Bhavnagar & Gandhinagar. It has to defend these citadels at all costs & limit the damage in villages to a minimum. BJP’s wins in 2012 were with greater margin (median: 19,000) vs Congress (median: 11,000 votes) so it additionally gives it some buffer in case their vote shares dips not too much vs 2012. Furthermore BJP could compensate their losses in one region by flipping some of the Congress seats which were won with narrower margins. Amit Shah has over the years built a very robust booth management system which should hold BJP in good stead. Even if the election is 50-50 as some polling agencies say it could come down to turnout & getting your voters to the booth.

For Congress to win it has to be a “wave” election where large sections of the BJP voter base either simply doesn’t show up and/or are so fed up with the present BJP government that they vote for Congress with a “throw the bums out” mentality. BJP would still be a significant favorite to win as it has a buffer of 20+ seats plus a larger winning margin (19k vs 11k) & 9% vote share delta. This means that even a significant 5% shift in vote percentage is not going to cut it for Congress as even in a virtual tie due to third party candidates & BJP organizational strength it would still win but with a small majority nevertheless.  An upset win for Congress wouldn’t shock me but would still be surprising given that there is some headroom/buffer that BJP has. Probability of Congress winning would be closer to 1/3 (close to what Nate Silver had for Trump who many thought had no chance of winning) while BJP remains a bigger 2/3 favorite.

Note: With successive elections in India it has become very hard to predict the exact number of. seats which will be won by all parties. If I had to take a wild guess maybe BJP wins with 3-4% vote share delta & seats in the low triple digits.

High Drama in the Himalayas - The Dolam Plateau standoff between India & China

On August 28^th, 2017 after more than 10 weeks of high tension, the border standoff between PLA [People’s Liberation Army] i.e. Chinese Army & the Indian Army was over. Indian soldiers disengaged from their confrontation with Chinese troops in a remote place on the Dolam Plateau [commonly referred to incorrectly as the Doklam Plateau in Indian media] in Bhutan just over the India/Bhutan border.  This standoff was not only a major talking point in the Indian media but also received quite bit of coverage in multiple news organizations around the world such as NY Times, BBC News, Washington Post, Time, Fortune, Al Jazeera, etc.

One might have several questions in regard to this story which I shall answer over the course of this blog

• First of all where in the world is this now infamous Dolam Plateau?
• If this is a dispute about Bhutan’s territory why aren’t Chinese troops being opposed by Bhutanese troop’s vs Indian troops?
• If this place is in Bhutan’s territory what are Chinese & Indian troops doing over there?
• If India’s territorial sovereignty is not being infringed upon why does India care & have to intervene in Bhutan?

The area in question (Dolam Plateau) is at the tri-junction area where borders of India (state of Sikkim), Bhutan & Tibet (controlled by China) meet.

Image: Courtesy of nytimes.com

The area of Tibet which extends to this tri-junction area is referred to as Chumbi Valley which points like a "dagger" southwards in between India & Bhutan.


TRI-JUNCTION AREA(ZOOMED IN VIEW)

As per the understanding between India & Bhutan the point where borders of all three countries is called Batang La. However China claims that the tri-junction (i.e. point where borders of the three countries meet) lies around 6.5km to the south at Gymochen or Gamochen & hence lays claim to the entire Dolam Plateau. In between both these points approximately 4km south of Batang La lies the Doka La where India stations it's troops on it's side of the border at an outpost.

Image: Courtesy of https://swarajyamag.com/defence/truths-mapped-out-india-cannot-afford-to-have-china-controlling-doklam-plateau

China since it claims the territory in south till Gymochen/Gamochen, over past several years has been building roads in Tibet not only to the actual border to Bhutan but also inside Bhutan itself. It built a motorable road around 2005 time frame (capable of  supporting big military vehicles) extending from the disputed border right up to the Doka La Pass. This was the status quo until June 15, 2017

Image: Courtesy of nytimes.com

On June 16th 2017 as per reports Chinese troops were going to start extension of this motorable road to the south towards their claimed border towards the south. This is when Indian Army soldiers at the Doka La outpost crossed over the international border with Bhutan & blocked them from proceeding with the construction. This created many firsts including the Indian Army crossing over into a 3rd country to confront Chinese troops. 

Image: Courtesy of nytimes.com
 This leads to an obvious question that why did India have to intervene on behalf of Bhutan when Bhutan's & not's India's territorial sovereignty was infringed upon. One must remember that Bhutan is a very tiny country sandwiched between two giants of Asia: India & China. Due to fears of being invaded by China, Bhutan signed a friendship treaty with India in 1949 (to avoid a fate like Tibet which was annexed by China around same time). One of the main principles of the treaty was "Bhutan agrees to to be guided by advice of India in regards to external relations". This meant that Bhutan had to compulsorily consult India on all aspects with regard to foreign relations (including with China). Bhutan is the only neighbor of China which doesn't have diplomatic relations with China. This treaty was later revised in 2007 to more looser terms saying that India & Bhutan to consult with one another on issues of national interest & not allow each other territories to be used in activities that are harmful to national security & interest of another. It is this exact wording in the India - Bhutan treaty which allows India the right to act on Bhutan's behalf for protecting not only Bhutan's but also India's own interest (more on that a bit later). Bhutan is very small nation which doesn't have a powerful army. They don't patrol the Dolam plateau regularly as it is both uninhabitable for most of year & it is of no strategic importance to them. Hence India had to take proactive action, crossing the international border & physically denying the Chinese from making any progress further south.

Next question is why would India be worried if China is intruding into a 3rd country. (Bhutan). There are 3 answer to this question : TERRAIN, TERRAIN & TERRAIN. In mountain warfare one the biggest advantage one can have over the enemy is being at a higher terrain than your enemy. This not only allows you to monitor enemy movements but makes it much harder for the enemy to dislodge you from that position. The attacker has to climb up high plus fight the defender at the same time . If the defender is in a well entrenched position he can easily inflict high casualties on the attacker. The 1999 war in Kargil & Operation Meghdoot to capture the Siachen glacier in 1984 are examples of this. Normally as per military doctrine an attacker needs a 3:1 force ratio to defeat while attacking & defeating an enemy. To mount a successful capture of a  high position held by an enemy that ratio could easily surpass 10:1 i.e. attacker would have to throw a huge amount of overwhelming manpower to achieve their objective.

Dolam Plateau (at 13,000 to 14,00 feet above sea level) is a relatively flat area surrounded by deep valleys & sharp peaks around it. These big peaks & deep valleys mean that navigating around it would be too next to impossible & the easiest way to move an army of men & vehicles would be to go right over it where terrain is relatively flat

As seen below in the next picture on the Sikkim - Tibet border (indicated by yellow line below) India controls all the peaks to the west while China controls the valley region in the center referred to as Chumbi Valley. Due to India controlling the heights all along the border up north any Chinese aggression from Tibet into Sikkim/India in this area can be repulsed due to the terrain advantage that India enjoys. India could easily deploy heavy artillery to target positions down in the Chumbi valley if their position came under threat. Additionally due to the shape/location of Chumbi Valley which is both narrow & shares a long border with Sikkim to the west it is highly susceptible to Indian counter attacks from the flanks.
After the 1962 war where India suffered big losses, India beefed up security all along the border with China including Sikkim. In 1967 Chinese troops had brief skirmish with Indian troops at Nathu La Pass (around 13-14km NW of Doka La Pass). Indian troops were able to successfully beat back the Chinese troops & hold their ground. Knowing all this it would be foolish for China to start even a small limited border skirmish in the tri-junction or eastern part of Sikkim. So how does one overcome such a issue. By launching a flanking maneuver where you can go for the enemy weak point via an alternate route. This was best exemplified in the Battle of Thermopylae where the million+ men strong Persian army were held up by a few thousand Greeks (sorry number was higher than 300 which is what the movie 300 leads you to believe) for 2 whole days.  On 3rd day they were led to an alternate route behind the Greeks back finally defeating them eventually.

 For China this flanking maneuver is going over the Dolam Plateau. Therefore it is imperative that they claim Gymochen as the "new" tri-junction point. This way they can lay their claim to the entire Dolam Plateau. Once the Dolam Plateau claimed as "Chinese" territory they can justify building their motorable road to the the southern edge of the Dolam Plateau which is Zompelri (Bhutanese)/ Jampheri Ridge. This is the proverbial "red line" that India does not want China to cross. If China got to the Zompelri Ridge it would be able climb down the foothills of the Himalayas & advance directly into northwest West Bengal (see green lines below where they could travel over the Dolam Plateau & down the foothills of Himalayas) which is just 20km from the Zompelri ridge . This would allow the Chinese to bypass the Indian defenses in Sikkim which have been strengthened over time & also where India enjoys the terrain advantage. The attack would be in northeast West Bengal where defenses are not setup as the border shared there is with Bhutan & not China.

A big worry to strategic observers in India is the threat to the Siliguri corridor referred to as "Chicken's neck". The Siliguri corridor is narrow piece of land (just 20 km wide at it's narrowest point) that connects the North-East with rest of India via West Bengal. This Siliguri corridor is just around 90km from the edge of the Zompelri ridge (as the crow fIies). In case an attack by China on this strategic bottleneck the road & rail links from North East to rest of India could be disrupted. This would essentially cut off 40-50 million people living in the North East could be cut off from the rest of India & provide China with a huge strategic advantage.

Therefore the intervention by Indian troops to enter a 3rd country Bhutan was essential. The goal was to stop the road building at around Doka La Pass across the international border . They could not allow a motorable road to be built up to the southern edge of the Dolam Plateau from where in times of war China could flank around India's strongholds in Sikkim instead attack down south in West Bengal potentially at India's weak point in the Siliguri corridor.

As seen by events in last few years in the South China Sea, China without any regard for international laws has repeatedly encroached in disputed territories with many of it's neighbors . Many of these nations either don't want to earn China's wrath by trying to block China from occupying such disputed areas or don't have the military might or resources to do so. Countries like Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia & Indonesia have protested through official statements from their governments but have been able do nothing on the ground as China gobbles up these territories with aggressive infrastructure building & intimidation/threats through official & semi official government media outlets. President of Philippines Rodrigo Duterte (referred to as Trump of South East Asia) is a strongman/hardliner has a no holds barred approach to all his opponents who he takes them on anytime & anywhere. In his bombastic style he first claimed that Philippines would extract oil from all areas under dispute with China which they claim to be rightfully theirs. He was known to never back down from a fight, but in May 2017 he shockingly overnight went soft on China once he was threatened with possible war by Xi Jinping, China's current President.

After the India intervention on June 16th 2017 Chinese were taken aback as they never had expected India to intervene like this. They had never been challenged by any of their neighbors in disputes like this before. China was like a bully who was used to having his own way doing as he pleases without anyone interfering. But like when an opponent strikes back at bullies it leaves him confused as he can't have his way anymore. He starts mouthing even more crazier threats to intimidate his opponent into submission. This is what exactly happened post June 16th 2017. Both the Chinese government & media went into frenzy denouncing the Indian action as hostile. They mentioned that India had violated China's territorial sovereignty & had to unconditionally withdraw troops or face the consequences. There were regular threats of war from editorials in their state sponsored mouthpiece newspapers. They mentioned that India hadn't learnt the bitter lessons of the war with China in 1962 & that it would teach it a lesson even worse than in the 1962 war. China had basically deployed full level of psychological warfare on India to intimidate India into backing down from Dolam similar to what it does in other territorial disputes with it's other neighbors.  

China even dusted off from its archives a 1890 treaty between Chinese empire (Qing dynasty) & British India which claimed that the border between Sikkim (which was an independent kingdom under British patronage) & Tibet started at Mount Gipmochi i.e. Gymochen (vs India assertion that it started in north at Batang La). 

"The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gimpochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nipal territory"

China to backup their claims even said that Jawaharlal Nehru accepted these claims in a letter to then Chinese PM in 1959. 

But as usual China tries to play dirty mind games where it doesn't reveal all the pertinent facts & distorts them willfully to press it claims.

1. The 1890 treaty was signed between the Chinese [Qing dynasty] & British empires. The irony here is that the treaty was related to border between 2 kingdoms: Tibet (under loose Chinese rule) & Sikkim(independent kingdom under protection by the British) who weren't even consulted on this. Furthermore Bhutan to whom this area belongs to today was not even part of discussions.
2. As per 1890 treaty the area under Tibet extends southwards till Mount Gimpochi as per Chinese claims. But this area was never fully demarcated & an official boundary was never published for the same leading to different interpretations today of where the border lies. Some historians claim that Sikkimese documents refer to Batang-La as Mount Gimpochi supporting India's claim.
3. Complicating matters, however, the Indian interpretation of the 1890 convention differs from the Chinese one in an important way and appears to be supported by geographic realities. Himalayan border delimitations in the late-19th and early-20th century, which relied on what’s known as the “watershed principle.” Effectively the border between British India and China was to be decided on the basis of the highest continuous mountain ridge line. In the case of Dolam, there is indeed a continuous ridgeline that runs from the current tri boundary point between India, Nepal, and China to the area at the center of the current standoff which appears to terminate at Batang-la, the point India and Bhutan claim as the tri boundary point, even though the convention’s text explicitly says “Mount Gipmochi.” Effectively, this puts the first sentence of the convention’s first article in conflict with the second and is likely an artifact of poor survey work in the late-19th century
4. Nehru in his letter to Chinese PM in 1959 mentioned that the issue of border between Sikkim & Tibet in the north (away from Dolam) is settled matter & there is no dispute over it. However the the boundaries of Sikkim & Bhutan do not fall within that scope. As Chinese had shown areas of Bhutan in their maps to be under Chinese claims he said that maps showing the same had to be rectified & is it is a matter to discussed along with India/Tibet boundary issue.
5. Furthermore the Indian side has underlined that the two Governments (China & India) had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding. So even if China's claims were valid this would have to be negotiated in talks between both countries.

Another example of Chinese duplicity when it comes to dealing with treaties from the colonial times is the 1914 Simla Accord. As per this treaty in 1914 the British & Tibetans (who were free of Chinese rule after fall of Qing dynasty in 1911) decided on the border between British claimed North East Frontier Province (present day Arunachal Pradesh) & Tibet. The border was clearly delimited on a map & referred to as the McMahon Line. China refuses to accept this as a border as they mentioned that they were not part of discussions on it & continue to claim Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet & thus a part of China. 

So in conclusion 1890 treaty which might benefit them due to an interpretation is fine & should be enforced while the 1914 Simla Accord which doesn't suit them is conveniently unjust & is not valid.

Back to present day, the Indian government should be credited as it stood it's ground in face of barrage of criticism & open threats from China knowing that any change in the status quo was non-negotiable & unacceptable. Indian government tried to keep the responses to the Chinese measured with no bluster or threats but simply asking for a return to the pre June 16 2017 positions. Unlike on Pakistan where not only some in India media but also in government go over the top with chest thumping there was mostly silence from India side except some periodic statements from MEA (Ministry of External Affairs). Modi had instructed to all in his party that only MEA was authorized to speak on this sensitive issue. This was to ensure that situation is not further inflamed which could possibly lead to war. What instead the India government did was open backchannel private negotiations with the Chinese to try to resolve this issue in a peaceful manner

In the end China agreed to back down for now for few reasons. On the ground with the Indians refusing to budge the situation had reached a stalemate & winter was soon approaching (at these high altitudes). Except the use of force, China was not going to able to start road construction any time soon. A use of force meant loss of lives & possible war. With upcoming BRICS Summit in China, it would have been an embarrassment for the host China if Modi had decided not to show up due to the Dolam dispute being not resolved. With America receding from the world stage with Trump's America First policy, China wants to fill that void showing itself to be the next true global leader. An absence by a big nation like India would have caused people to poke holes in the assertion that China was a world leader who can work together with everyone. To save face for both sides, the respective governments claimed sort of "moral victory" in their official statements which weren't highly detailed: India claimed that China has agreed to go back to status quo by abandoning the road work while China claimed that Indian troops have returned back over the border to India & they reserve the right to mount foot patrols in the Dolam Plateau which they had been doing even before the crisis erupted in June.

However due to the economic growth slowdown in China as it gradually shifts from a developing to a major world economy there could possibly some economic issues for it's people. Having huge number of people in  distress could easily lead to mass protests. This could then spiral out of control & create headache for the government which believes in tightly controlling all aspects of people's lives. In such times in the future,  the Chinese government would not be averse to a brief all out war or a skirmish somewhere along the border to distract it's people with nationalism which already is on the rise in China for the past few years.

In the end most believe that India did win this round by forcing China back to the status quo situation pre June 16th 2017. Many were glad to see that cooler heads prevailed on both sides & issue was resolved without any untoward incident & also without any jingoistic rhetoric on the Indian side (which is directed towards Pakistan on a regular basis). This should however be an eye opener for India that it needs to be work doubly harder to guard India's safety interests. China was truly caught off guard by the speed & effectiveness of the Indian response in Dolam as they were under impression that no one will date oppose them like in South China Sea. The Dolam standoff is over for now but now the fear is that the Chinese might come back doubly hard having learnt the lessons of Dolam in another sector like Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh where terrain might not be to India's advantage. India cannot afford to relax & needs to urgently upgrade all border infrastructure to match China's huge strides in border infrastructure in Tibet. This will ensure that any new Chinese misadventure is nipped in the bud.

Bhutan was mightily relieved that it's nuclear neighbors didn't go to war as it would have been caught in the middle & suffered great losses. China which doesn't have diplomatic relations with Bhutan has tried hard over the years to establish both trade & economic relations with Bhutan but all their overtures have been declined by Bhutan. In the past China has tried to negotiate directly with Bhutan for territorial disputes in other areas in addition to Dolam. They made an offer to Bhutan to settle the northern disputed areas in favor of Bhutan if they give up their claim on Dolam which is of strategic importance to China to threaten India. India needs to continue to build strong relationship with Bhutan to ensure such Faustian deals are never ever accepted by Bhutan. I know that Modi's foreign trips are constant source of  debate but if you can guess the destination of his first overseas trip consider yourself as a general knowledge genius! His first trip after becoming PM was to of all countries : Bhutan. He understood the threat from China & wanted to reiterate the special relationship that India enjoys with Bhutan.

Recently China has been pursuing the "string of pearls" strategy where they try to encircle India with establishing relationships with India's neighbors (both land border & at sea in Indian Ocean) with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, Maldives, etc. China has been trying to project it's economic power by building infrastructure for India's neighbors. However many of these projects like the one in Sri Lanka's Hambantota port where China offers very easy credit/loans however with high interest rates . Small nations take advantage of these easy loans but when many of these projects don't pan out economically, China  instead of requesting interest payments will take over equity in these projects. This would give them control of infrastructure which could very well used in future for Chinese military purposes. India's needs to counter this policy by trying to build relationships around the India Ocean including investing time & money in these nations for peaceful purposes unlike the Chinese. Since China is playing in India's backyard (Indian Ocean) it might not be the worst idea of starting to begin working with some the aggrieved neighbors of China in the South China Sea (China's own backyard) to build new relationships to counteract China increasing hegemony in Asia in the future. India's best bet for protecting her vital national security interests is building alliances with other countries in Asia who also feel threatened by China's expansionist policies as there is some doubt whether its newer close friend USA or older close friend Russia would take sides with India in the future in case of war with China.